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ALES ˇ BULÍR ˇ and A. JAVIER HAMANN*
This article examines empirical evidence on the volatility and uncertainty of aid
flows and their main policy implications. Aid is found to be more volatile than
fiscal revenues—particularly in highly aid-dependent countries—and shortfalls in
aid and domestic revenue tend to coincide. The article also finds that uncertainty
about aid disbursements is large and that the information content of commitments
made by donors is either very small or statistically insignificant. Specific policies
and broader international efforts to cope with these features of aid are briefly
discussed. [JEL F35, O19]
T
his article documents key cyclical properties of external aid flows from the
point of view of the recipient country: their degree of volatility and pre-
dictability, and the way in which they covary with domestic economic activity.
Why the focus on the cyclical properties of aid? First, available estimates of the
welfare cost of business fluctuations in developing countries suggest that they are
significantly larger than those in industrial economies.1 Developing countries tend
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1Pallage and Robe (2001b) estimate that, on average, the welfare cost of output volatility in sub-Saharan
Africa could be as much as 15–20 times higher than that in the United States.to be subject to more frequent and stronger external shocks and are less able to
cope with them owing to pervasive liquidity constraints and the lack of effective
countercyclical policy tools. A direct implication of this result is that advice to
developing countries should pay more attention to reducing volatility (Caballero,
2000). Second, these countries are also likely to be recipients of large aid flows,
which have been found to be very volatile (see the discussion of this issue later
on). This feature of aid can indirectly offset some of its direct beneficial effects by,
for example, complicating the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy or exacer-
bating exchange rate variability (Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 1989). In particu-
lar, the negative aspects of the volatility of aid flows will be larger, the higher the
covariance between fluctuations in aid and output, or domestic fiscal revenue.2
In principle, dealing with aid volatility could be more challenging than deal-
ing with commodity price volatility. Only a few recent empirical studies have
focused on the magnitude and consequences of aid volatility (and on best practices
to deal with them) in contrast with the case of export price instability, where the
main issues have been dealt with extensively in the economic literature.3 Lensink
and Morrissey (2000) find that the effect of aid on growth is insignificant unless
some measure of aid uncertainty is included in the cross-country regressions and
that uncertainty about aid is detrimental to growth. Gemmell and McGillivray
(1998), using a sample of 48 developing countries, find that shortfalls in aid are
followed most frequently by reductions in government spending, sometimes by
increases in taxes, and sometimes by both. In other words, the typical aid-receiving
country is unable to offset an unexpected nondisbursement of aid by borrowing
and has to resort to costly, swift, and possibly inefficient fiscal adjustment.4 They
also find that aid is significantly more volatile than revenue and that, on average,
aid tends to be procyclical. (That is, countries tend to receive more aid in years
when economic activity is on the rise; this, in turn, may imply a positive correla-
tion between aid and fiscal revenues.) These results are corroborated by Pallage
and Robe (2001a) for a sample of African countries. To the best of our knowledge,
Collier (1999) is the only study that finds aid (to sub-Saharan Africa) to be less
volatile than tax revenues and countercyclical.5
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2Assuming that government spending is financed only with tax revenues and foreign aid, it is possi-
ble to show that the loss function of a risk-averse policymaker interested in minimizing deviations of pub-
lic spending from planned levels is a positive function of the covariance between aid disbursements and
actual revenues. This, however, is a point about the cyclical movement of aid, not its level. Throughout
this article, we abstract from the issue of aid effectiveness or even from the effect of aid volatility on
growth. For a recent survey of those issues, see, for example, Hansen and Tarp (2000 and 2001).
3Varangis and Larson (1996) provide a clear explanation of the problems posed by commodity price
uncertainty and clarify the differences among the main instruments to deal with price variability, unpre-
dictability, and expenditure smoothing. Engel and Meller (1993) contain a set of case studies analyzing
best policies to neutralize external shocks in developing countries: stabilization funds and the use of finan-
cial instruments. In practice, however, donors would not accept aid funds going into a reserve fund and
aid-dependent countries lack access to the necessary financial instruments.
4Of course, incomplete adjustment to the shortfall in aid is likely to crowd out private investment
and/or create inflationary pressures (Hadjimichael and others, 1995).
5Collier (1999) is also the only study based on nondetrended data. He takes his results to imply that
“a budget with a large component of aid would be more reliable than one with a low component of aid”
(p. 542) and that all committed aid should be included in the budget.In this article, we reexamine these issues using a broader database than those
used in the studies cited above (including both publicly available time-series data
and a cross section of detailed data provided by IMF desk officers for countries
receiving aid) and examine the extent to which the results vary with aid depen-
dency. In line with the studies of Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) and Pallage
and Robe (2001a), we find, first, that aid is substantially more volatile than fiscal
revenue and that this relative volatility increases with the degree of aid depen-
dency as measured by the aid-to-revenue ratio. We also find some evidence that
aid and domestic revenue tend to move in the same direction and that countries
suffering from relatively high revenue volatility also exhibit higher volatility in
aid receipts.
Second, time-series data show that commitments by donors consistently
exceed disbursements and that aid cannot be predicted reliably on the basis of
donors’ commitments alone. Cross-sectional data from IMF-supported country
programs reveal that commitment-based projections tend to overestimate project
and, to a much higher degree, program aid. In addition, intra-year disbursements
of program aid differ significantly from projections. Despite their poor track
record as a predictor of disbursements, commitments continue to be used in bud-
getary exercises in aid-receiving countries, mainly as a result of pressures from
donor countries and/or agencies. This deficiency continues to hamper fiscal and
monetary projections in aid-dependent countries.
Since the economic effects of aid are largely determined by the recipient coun-
try’s budgetary practices, we stress the need to account properly for aid volatility
when designing adjustment programs in aid-receiving countries—particularly
when it comes to planning for the possibility of delays and/or shortfalls in aid dis-
bursements vis-à-vis commitments. Finally, we discuss briefly measures that can
be taken by both donors and aid recipients—mainly regarding compliance with
program objectives, program design, coordination among donors, and improved
disbursement procedures in donor countries—in order to reduce the volatility and
unpredictability of aid and, thus, enhance its overall effects. 
The article is organized as follows. Section I discusses briefly our data
sources, as well as some problems posed by the need to select a common unit of
measurement for several variables and the limitations of using aggregate data on
aid. Section II looks at various measures of the relative instability of foreign aid
and fiscal revenues. Section III deals with the issue of predictability of aid flows
and the information content of commitments made by donors. This section also
looks at the accuracy of predictions of aid made at various stages of a program
supported by the donor community. Section IV concludes with a discussion of the
main policy implications of our findings.
I. Data Sources and Measurement Issues
In this section, we discuss the origin and scope of our data, as well as some
problems associated with their measurement. These problems relate to the lim-
itations of any empirical analysis based on aggregate aid estimates, problems
linked to the selection of a common unit of measurement (denominator) for aid
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and revenue time series.
The Dataset
Our database covers 72 countries from 1975 to 1997. The data on aid were taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), which, in turn, are
based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
data on official development assistance (ODA). Fiscal data used in this study—
total domestic revenue in local currency—were drawn from two sources. For 60
countries, the series were available from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS). For the remaining 12 countries, all of which are in sub-Saharan
Africa and Asia, we used data provided by IMF country desk officers. Even with
these additions, complete revenue series for the period 1975–97 are available for
only 47 countries (see Table A1 in Appendix I). Data on GDP in local currency
units, average exchange rates, and population were also drawn from WDI.
In principle, aid data are available for more than 100 countries; however, not
all aid recipients represent relevant cases for this study. For example, some former
aid recipients became donors, and several former communist countries joined the
pool of aid recipients, in the early 1990s. Thus, to compile a consistent database,
we considered only countries that remained aid recipients throughout the whole
period and met the following selection criteria: (i) at least eight annual observa-
tions were available; (ii) at least one IMF-supported program was in effect during
the sample period; and (iii) the country had a population of at least 400,000. The
second criterion was intended to capture the mobilizing impact of IMF programs
on aid flows and their composition. The third criterion was intended to eliminate
the small-country bias (World Bank, 2000). Use of these three criteria narrowed
the potential sample to 72 countries.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (not reported here but available from the
authors upon request) indicate that both aid and revenue series are nonstationary
(or, in a few cases, stationary around a deterministic trend). As a result, we
detrended our aid and revenue series using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) and
only then computed conventional measures of volatility.6 To test the robustness of
our results, we recalculated the measures of volatility using first-differenced data.
These results (not reported here but available from the authors upon request) dif-
fered only marginally from those based on the HP filter.
The Composition of Aid
ODA comprises balance of payments support, investment projects, food aid, debt
and emergency relief, peacemaking efforts, technical assistance, concessional fund-
ing to multilateral development funds, and other small categories of aid. However,
more than 90 percent of aid falls in the first two categories.7 Of course, certain
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6Following Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), we set λ at 7. Changing the value of λ does not seem to affect
our results materially.
7Of this, project aid accounts for more than one-half.categories of aid are bound to be more volatile than others: for example, food aid is
disbursed only during disaster periods.8 In fact, aggregate volatility of aid may be
high (low), even though the volatility of aid components may be low (high) when
the covariance between the components is positive (negative) and large.9
But there is an additional dimension to the aid heterogeneity problem: dif-
ferent forms of aid have different conditionality. For example, some forms of
aid are disbursed if an IMF-supported program is considered to be “on track”;
others may have sector-specific conditionality; and in other cases, disburse-
ments may depend on historic donor-recipient relations (Alesina and Dollar,
2000). Unfortunately, the literature offers little evidence on the empirical rele-
vance of these points for aid volatility.10 Hence, we use the aggregate ODA def-
inition of aid in Section II and the first subsection of Section III and investigate
aid predictability separately for project and program aid in the second subsec-
tion of Section III.
Common Denominator for Aid and Fiscal Revenue
The choice of a common denominator matters for the statistical measures of rela-
tive volatility. Aid and revenue are denominated in U.S. dollars and domestic cur-
rency units, respectively, and their comparisons require first expressing both
variables in the same currency. Hence, statistical measures of relative volatility are
affected by the exchange rate. The impact of exchange rate volatility can be very
large: on average, the volatility of the exchange rate (measured by the coefficient
of variation) in trended, raw data is almost forty times higher than that of aid.
We use two common measures: percentages of GDP and current U.S. dol-
lars in per capita terms.11 On the one hand, when expressing aid and revenue in
U.S. dollars per capita, the volatility of domestic revenue becomes a composite
measure of revenue volatility in local currency terms and exchange rate volatil-
ity. On the other hand, when expressing the variables as percentages of GDP,
the volatility of aid becomes a composite measure of aid volatility in U.S. dol-
lars, exchange rate volatility, and the impact of those variables on GDP. Owing
to the lack of a preferred denominator for aid and revenue, we use both trans-
formations and keep in mind the biases that each of them are likely to introduce
when interpreting our results.
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8Although it is often stated that fungibility of its various components makes foreign aid homoge-
neous, this statement is not always correct. For example, aid is not fungible when the preferences of
donors and aid recipients differ (Lancaster, 1999; and Bulíﬁ and Lane, 2002).
9Bulíﬁ and Hamann (2001) illustrate this point in the case of Malawi.
10The few small-scale studies that have tried to decompose aid into various subcategories have either
rejected parameter constancy across regions (White, 1992; and Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell, 1987 and
1992) or found the impact of aid to be insignificant in a cross-country setup (Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell,
1992). Individual country studies are also inconclusive (Pack and Pack, 1990 and 1993).
11Arguably, measuring aid and revenue in U.S. dollars per capita is preferable if they both were to
be spent on tradable goods, whose prices tend to be fixed in U.S. dollars (Bulíﬁ and Lane, 2002). In real-
ity, a significant portion of aid proceeds is spent on nontradable goods. More generally, if the objective is
to assess the macroeconomic impact of aid, the relevant denominator is the aid-to-GDP ratio.AID VOLATILITY: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
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II. Measuring the Relative Variability of Aid and Revenue
This section reviews our findings on the relative volatility of aid and domestic fis-
cal revenue. We detrend aid and revenue series and calculate the variances of these
series, θ A and θ R,r espectively. A measure of relative volatility is then defined as
the ratio of these variances, Φ = θ A/θ R.
In the rest of this section we examine the properties of the measure of relative
volatility, Φ . In particular, we (i) calculate Φ for each country; (ii) look at the fre-
quency distribution of individual country Φ s and test the significance of averages
and medians across countries;12 (iii) test the relationship of Φ s vis-à-vis other vari-
ables, such as the correlation coefficients between (detrended) aid and revenue and
the ratio of (not detrended) aid to revenue (that is, aid dependency); and (iv) in
order to check the robustness of our results, arrange countries into two subgroups
according to their degree of aid dependency and compare the results for the full
sample with those obtained for the smaller samples. Thus, we carry out our calcu-
lations not only for the full sample of 72 countries but also for a subsample of
countries with aid-to-revenue ratios of 10 percent or more (57 countries and 55
countries, respectively, when measured in percent of GDP and U.S. dollars per
capita) and also for a subsample of countries with aid-to-revenue ratios of 50 per-
cent or more (33 countries and 29 countries, respectively, when measured in per-
cent of GDP and U.S. dollars per capita). The first cutoff point eliminates the more
developed Latin American and Asian countries from the sample, while the second
cutoff point defines a group of highly aid-dependent countries, mostly from sub-
Saharan Africa. The results are presented in Table 1.
Our first finding is that aid is more volatile than revenue, particularly in coun-
tries with a high aid-to-revenue ratio. On the one hand, when variables are
expressed as percentages of GDP, aid is, on average, more volatile than revenue
in all samples, and this result is statistically significant. (The F-test fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the average Φ s are larger than one at the 1 percent level
of significance in every case.)13 Furthermore, the relative volatility of aid grows
with aid dependence: the average value of Φ increases from 3.94 to 7.42 as the
sample is narrowed down to the most aid-dependent countries. (The results for
the median values of Φ follow a similar pattern.) On the other hand, when the
variables are expressed in U.S. dollars per capita, the average Φ is also bigger
than one in all samples, but in the full sample, the difference from one is statisti-
cally significant at only the 10 percent level. These results confirm that the choice
of the scale variable matters. In the other two subsamples, aid is, on average, rel-
atively more volatile than revenue and the results are statistically significant at
the 5 percent level or better. Again, the average value of Φ increases with aid
dependency (from 11/3 to 3). The estimated medians also grow as the sample is
restricted to more aid-dependent countries, but they are not significantly different
from one, except for Subsample 2.
12Given that Φ is a ratio of variances, estimated with a common number of observations per country,
we checked the statistical significance of sample averages using an F-test. The significance of sample
medians was checked using a “runs test” (SPSS, Inc., 1999).
13See Table A1 in Appendix I for country-specific estimates of the absolute volatility of aid and revenue.We also found that countries where aid is more volatile than revenue, Φ >1 ,
outnumber those with higher relative revenue volatility, particularly in the subsam-
ple of the most aid-dependent countries. When variables are expressed as percent-
ages of GDP, the share of countries with more volatile aid grows from about half in
the full sample to about 2/3 in the middle sample and to well over 4/5 in the sample
of the most aid-dependent countries. For variables denominated in dollars per
capita, there are more cases of aid being less variable than revenues in the full and
middle samples. In contrast, in the last subsample, countries with higher relative aid
volatility outnumber those with higher revenue volatility by a margin of 5 to 2.
Second, we find that the relationship between the relative volatility of aid and
aid dependency is robust.14 The first column of Table 2 shows the correlation coef-
ficients between Φ and aid dependency in each of the three samples. The measure
used makes little difference in this case: the simple correlation coefficients between
Φ  and the aid-to-revenue ratio are of the order of 0.5–0.6 in the full sample, 0.5 in
Ales ˇ Bulír ˇ and A.Javier Hamann
70
Table 1. Relative Volatility of Aid and Revenue (Φ )
Subsample 1 Subsample 2
(Aid-to-revenue (Aid-to-revenue
ratio larger ratio larger
Full Sample than 10 percent) than 50 percent)
Variables expressed in percent of GDP1
Average 3.94*** 4.96*** 7.42***
Median 1.10 2.19*** 4.91***
Frequency indicators
Sample size 72 57 33
Number of countries where Φ >1 3 7 37 28
Number of countries where Φ <1 3 5 20 5
Aid-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 70.4 85.9 129.9
Variables expressed in U.S. dollars per capita1
Average 1.33* 1.73** 3.00***
Median 0.36 0.80 2.25*
Frequency indicators
Sample size 72 55 29
Number of countries where Φ >1 2 3 23 21
Number of countries where Φ <1 4 9 32 8
Aid-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 64.5 83.1 132.6
Source: Appendix I, Table A1.
1The null hypotheses that Φ > 1 is tested for averages with an F-test and for medians with a “runs
test”; the symbols *, **,a n d   *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 per-
cent level, respectively.
14This result is not driven by lower absolute revenue volatility in aid-dependent countries. For exam-
ple, narrowing the sample to countries with aid-to-revenue ratios of more than 50 percent leads to
increases in average absolute aid volatility of 90 percent and 80 percent when variables are expressed in
percent of GDP and in dollars per capita, respectively. By comparison, revenue volatility increases by
80 percent and declines by 97 percent, respectively. See Table A1 in Bulíﬁ and Hamann (2001).AID VOLATILITY: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
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Subsample 1, and a much lower 0.2–0.3 in Subsample 2. The rank correlation
coefficients (Spearman’s ρ ) are about 0.7–0.9 in the full and middle samples and
about 0.2–0.5 in the most aid-dependent group. The positive correlation between
the relative volatility of aid and aid dependency is statistically significant in all
cases but one (Subsample 2, when variables are expressed in U.S. dollars per
capita). The weaker results in the smallest subsample may reflect the fact that by
eliminating countries with a low aid-to-revenue ratio, we substantially lower the
variance of the aid-to-revenue ratio series. In any case, we would stress that the
average Φ  is about 20 times higher in the 10 most aid-dependent countries than in
the 10 least aid-dependent countries.
Table 2. Relationship Between Aid and Revenue Flows
(aid and revenue measured as differences from its Hodrick-Prescott filter)
Correlation Coefficient
———————————————————
Relative volatility Volatilities 
and aid-to-revenue  Aid and  of aid and 
ratio1 revenue2 revenue3
Variables expressed in percent of GDP
All countries (sample size=72)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.53*** 0.07* 0.29**
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ ) 0.85*** 0.40***
Subsample 1 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 
10 percent; sample size=57)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.45*** 0.08* 0.28**
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ ) 0.72*** 0.52***
Subsample 2 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 
50 percent; sample size=33)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.34* 0.05 0.34*
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ ) 0.49*** 0.55***
Variables expressed in U.S. dollars per capita
All countries (sample size=72)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.56*** 0.10** 0.08
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ ) 0.89*** 0.19
Subsample 1 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 
10 percent; sample size=55)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.49** 0.09** 0.10
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ ) 0.78** 0.56**
Subsample 2 (aid-to-revenue ratio larger than 
50 percent; sample size=29)
Simple correlation coefficient (Pearson) 0.17 0.11* 0.92***
Rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ ) 0.18 0.76***
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Bank, World Development Indicators;
and authors’ calculations.
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and
1 percent level, respectively.
1Correlation coefficient between each country’s Φ and its aid-to-revenue ratio.
2Average of individual countries’ correlation coefficients between detrended aid and revenue.
3Correlation coefficient of each country’s aid and revenue variances (θ ).Ales ˇ Bulír ˇ and A.Javier Hamann
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Third, we find that deviations of aid and revenue from their respective trends
are positively correlated (see the second column of Table 2). The averages of indi-
vidual correlation coefficients of detrended aid and revenue are always positive
and of similar size in all samples, although the degrees of statistical significance
are somewhat lower than in the case of relative volatility. A look at the distribu-
tion of correlation coefficients (Figure 1) reveals that they are concentrated to the
right of zero and that only a small number of countries exhibit large negative cor-
relations. Furthermore, the share of countries with a correlation coefficient smaller
than –0.3 falls between 5 percent and 10 percent, whereas the share of countries
with a correlation coefficient larger than 0.3 is 35–40 percent, depending on
whether the variables are expressed as percentages of GDP or in U.S. dollars per
capita. Thus, the results provide some support for the view that shortfalls in aid
tend to coincide with shortfalls in domestic revenue, a result that we interpret as
an indirect measure of the procyclicality of aid.
Finally, we find that shocks to domestic revenue are correlated with those to
foreign aid (last column of Table 2). The correlation coefficients between the vari-
ances of detrended aid (θ A) and detrended revenue (θ R) are stable at about 1/3 for
the variables in percent of GDP and grow from 0.1 to 0.9 for the variables in dol-
lars per capita. While the sign of the correlation coefficient might have been
expected, the size of the correlation coefficients and their stability across different
samples are surprising.
We summarize our main results graphically in Figure 2, where the top panel cor-
responds to variables expressed in percent of GDP and the bottom panel to variables
denominated in dollars per capita. Each panel captures three dimensions: on the hor-
izontal axis, we plot the relative volatility of aid, Φ ; on the vertical axis, the correla-
tion coefficient of aid and revenue; and each observation is represented by a bubble
whose size indicates the country’s aid-to-revenue ratio. First, we observe that aid is
more volatile than revenue in countries with high aid dependency, since most of the
“larger” bubbles are to the right of the vertical line Φ =1. Second, the majority of
bubbles are in positive territory (that is, above the horizontal line corresponding to a
zero correlation between aid and revenue). Moreover, in only a few aid-dependent
countries—that is, those with “larger” bubbles—the correlation between detrended
aid and revenue is negative. This pattern is more pronounced in the bottom panel,
where aid and revenue are measured in dollars per capita.
III. Predictability of Aid
In this section, we establish some stylized facts regarding the predictability of aid
both in general and in the context of IMF-supported programs. To this end, we carry
out two separate exercises. The first one is based on time-series data on aid dis-
bursements and commitments measured in current U.S. dollars and seeks to assess
the information content of commitments in the context of a simple autoregressive
model for aid disbursements. Available time series were typically longer in this case,
since there was no need to compute them as percentages of GDP or to constrain them
to be of equal length as revenue series. The second exercise is based on responses 
to a questionnaire completed by IMF country desk economists. The results of thisAID VOLATILITY: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
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Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of the Cyclical Character of Aid
(relative frequency)
Source: Table A1 in Appendix I.Ales ˇ Bulír ˇ and A.Javier Hamann
74






05 1 0 15 20

















































































































Country with aid-to-revenue 
ratio of 50 percent.
Country with aid-to-revenue 
ratio of 100 percent.
1
1
Figure 2. Characteristics of Aid: Volatility, Cyclicality, and Dependency
(size of bubble indicates aid-to-revenue ratio)
Source: Table A1 in Appendix I.questionnaire allow us to test whether there are systematic differences among com-
mitments made by donors, projections prepared in the context of IMF-supported pro-
grams, and actual disbursements.
The Time-Series Evidence
Our main objective in this section is not to develop an elaborate forecasting
model for disbursements based on all available information but, instead, to test
the significance of commitments in the context of a parsimonious model. The rea-
son for focusing on commitments is that they are commonly used by recipient
countries, largely as a result of the complex politics that surround budgetary pro-
cesses in these countries. Here we examine whether this politically sensitive vari-
able is also a good predictor of disbursements.
Before turning to the estimation of the marginal contribution of commitments,
C, to the prediction of disbursements, D, we would like to provide some basic infor-
mation on these two variables measured in current U.S. dollars for our sample of 72
countries. A simple look at individual-country plots of their C and D series (avail-
able from the authors upon request) reveals two salient features: several episodes of
spikes in commitments that, generally, were not followed by increased disburse-
ments; and a systematic tendency for commitments to exceed disbursements.
The first point reflects a propensity for donors to react, in terms of large
increases in commitments but not necessarily in disbursements, to positive
changes in recipient countries, such as occurred in the Central African Republic
following the end of Bokassa’s regime in the early 1990s or the end of the civil
war in Mozambique in the mid-1990s. The exceptions to the second point are
mainly (but not exclusively) a relatively small number of instances within our
sample in which a country has received some form of financial help following an
unforeseen balance of payments crisis. These cases, however, are concentrated
among countries with higher levels of income per capita and capital mobility and
low aid dependency. For the other countries in our sample, the C-to-D ratio was
larger than one (that is, commitments exceeded disbursements), with the implicit
average overprediction of disbursements reaching up to 20 percent.15
Although the simple calculations discussed above reveal that commitments
tend to overestimate disbursements by a relatively wide margin, they do not reveal
much about the information value of a commitment figure for predicting aid for
the budget. In order to assess the marginal value of aid commitments in predicting
aid disbursements in the context of a simple autoregressive model, we estimated
the following equation for the same sample of countries as in the previous section:
(1) ∆∆ ∆ DD C ti
i
K
ti t t =+ + +
=
− ∑ ββ γε 0
1
.
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15Of the 71 countries in the sample (Cambodia had to be excluded from this exercise owing to the
small number of observations available), only 18 received on average more aid than was committed. Of
these, half have very low aid-to-revenue ratios and are among the best-known cases of balance of pay-
ments crisis-related financial assistance (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines,
Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela).The equation was estimated in first differences because of the nonstationarity of
both commitments and disbursements (with K representing the lag length). The abil-
ity of commitments to help predict the future course of disbursements is tested
through the statistical significance of γ . We would expect that γ should be not only
statistically significant but also positive and close to one if commitments contained
high marginal information value. Of course, there are no simple a priori interpreta-
tions for the possible failure of γ to be significantly different from zero. Potential rea-
sons for the failure of commitments to materialize include, inter alia, noncompliance
by the receiving country with conditions attached to committed aid, delays associ-
ated with administrative problems in donor countries, or simply changes in underly-
ing economic and/or political developments. Whatever the case, though, we think
that it is important to document the predictive power of a variable that is widely used
in fiscal-programming exercises, mainly in response to pressure from donors.
The estimation process was carried out in two steps. In the first step, two alter-
native values of K were selected from a version of equation (1) that did not include
∆ Ct: those that minimized the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the
Schwartz-Bayes Information Criterion (SBIC). The value of γ was then estimated
by adding ∆ Ct as a regressor in the resulting equations. The results obtained using
the AIC are summarized in Table 3; there are no substantial differences between
the results obtained under the AIC and those obtained under the SBIC.
In general, the estimated γ s are not statistically significant, especially in coun-
tries with higher aid-dependency ratios. When all countries are considered, γ is
significant at the 5 percent level in about one-third of the regressions.16 In these
cases, the average value of γ is about 0.4; however, the median value is smaller
(about one-third), reflecting the fact that the estimated value of γ was quite large
for only a few countries: γ was higher than 0.7 in 5 higher-income countries with
very low aid-to-revenue ratios (Argentina, Mexico, Panama, Turkey, and
Venezuela).17 The estimated values of γ decreased (and the difference between
their average and median values narrowed significantly) when the sample of coun-
tries was reduced to cases in which aid represents at least 10 percent of revenues.
The estimated value of γ did not change further when the sample was reduced to
countries where aid represents at least 50 percent of revenues, but the share of
regressions with γ s significant at the 5 percent level fell from about 1/3 in the full
sample to about 1/5. When the level of statistical significance was lowered to
10 percent, none of the conclusions described above changed significantly.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from Table 3.18 First, the marginal pre-
dictive power of commitments made by donors is statistically significant in only a
relatively small fraction of the countries in our sample, and this fraction falls as
the sample is reduced to include only countries where aid is relatively important.
Second, even among countries where commitments contain statistically significant
information about future disbursements, the results suggest that commitments
should not necessarily be taken at face value.
Ales ˇ Bulír ˇ and A.Javier Hamann
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17The estimated value of γ was between 0.9 and 1.0 in Argentina, Turkey, and Venezuela.
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Finally, in line with the results of Section II, we explored the relationship
between predictability of aid, as measured by γ , and a few other variables. The top
two panels of Figure 3 plot the estimated values of γ against the aid-to-revenue
ratio and GDP per capita, respectively (the panels also show a fitted regression line
and the estimated regression coefficient). The relationship is negative in the first
case, positive in the second case, and the estimated regression coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results show quite clearly that
the predictive power of donors’ commitments tends to be lower in poorer and in
more aid-dependent countries. The bottom two panels of Figure 3 plot the esti-
mated γ s against the two measures of relative aid volatility (Φ ). In both cases, the
relationship is negative, albeit not statistically significant, indicating only a weak
correlation between volatility and unpredictability.
How Good Are Aid Projections in IMF-Supported Programs?
The survey
The results in this subsection are based on responses by 37 IMF desk economists to
a questionnaire we sent them in late 1999. (See Appendix II, Table A2 for a list of
the countries.) Although the definition of aid employed in this questionnaire was
intended to be as close as possible to that based on the OECD’s ODA definition, in
most cases the IMF estimates of aid inflows are smaller. This discrepancy reflects
the asymmetric nature of information on aid between donors and recipients: data on
Table 3. Commitments Are Poor Predictors of Actual Disbursements
(estimated values of γ in italics)
Equations Based on Akaike Information Criterion
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
All countries Subsample 11 Subsample 2 2
All regressions
Number of countries 71 56 32
percentage of total sample 100 100 100
Average value of γ 0.21 0.13 0.09
Median value of γ 0.15 0.12 0.07
Regressions where γ was significant at 5 percent
Number of countries 24 15 6
percentage of total sample 34 27 19
Average value of γ 0.43 0.32 0.33
Median value of γ 0.33 0.29 0.31
Regressions where γ was significant at 10 percent
Number of countries 30 20 9
percentage of total sample 42 36 28
Average value of γ 0.42 0.31 0.30
Median value of γ 0.33 0.28 0.29
Source: Authors’ estimates.
1Countries where aid represents more than 10 percent of government revenues.
2Countries where aid represents more than 50 percent of government revenues.Ales ˇ Bulír ˇ and A.Javier Hamann
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        Source: Authors' estimates. 
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Figure 3. Aid-Dependent, Poor Countries and Countries with Volatile Aid 
Also Have Less Predictable Aid
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Notes: The slope of the regression line is denoted by β . The symbol ** indicates statistical
significance at the 5 percent level.AID VOLATILITY: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
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such components as technical assistance; peacemaking efforts; and other, smaller
categories of aid are often not reported to the recipient country and, hence, are not
recorded in the countries’ fiscal and balance of payments accounts on which the
responses to our questionnaires were based.
We divided aid projections into the following four different categories related to
the life of IMF-supported programs: “original projections,” “budget projections,”
“IMF program projections,” and “disbursements.” See Table 4 for an overview of
the projection categories and Bulíﬁ and Hamann (2001) for a detailed description of
the results of the questionnaire.
Project aid
Table 5 shows the results of the survey expressed as percentages of the IMF pro-
gram projection. This is an intuitive normalization—for example, the figure of 94.9
in the last column of the first row indicates that the average aid disbursement was
Table 4. Categorization of Aid Projections
Original IMF  Program Budget  Disbursement
Projection Projection Projection (actual data)
Timing
Project aid One year ahead Normally at the  Early in the year Available 
start of the year immediately
Program aid One year ahead Normally at the  Normally at the  Following year,




Project aid IMF staff, IMF staff, Authorities, Authorities,
authorities, donors, authorities, donors, donors, and donors, and
and World Bank and World Bank World Bank World Bank
Program aid IMF staff, IMF staff, IMF staff, Authorities,
authorities, donors, authorities, donors, authorities, donors, donors, and
and World Bank and World Bank and World Bank World Bank
Basis for projections
Project aid Heavily discounted  Commitments with Updated donor —
preliminary commit- 5–10 percent  commitments
ments and history  discount
of disbursements
Program aid Heavily discounted  Updated donor Same as  —
preliminary commit- commitments IMF-program
ments and history  projection
of disbursements
Number of observations
Project aid 27 32 24 32
Program aid 23 28 ... 28
Source: Authors’estimates.lower than the IMF projection by 5.1 percent. The average disbursement of project
aid falls short of all types of projections and the ranking of errors is unambiguous:
budget projections are the worst, with an average error of 15 percent; IMF program
projections are the most accurate, with an average error of 5 percent; while original
projections fall in the middle, with an average error of almost 8 percent.19
Interruptions in IMF programs appear to have limited impact on disbursements. The
fact that budget projections fare the worst even though they are prepared relatively
Ales ˇ Bulír ˇ and A.Javier Hamann
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Table 5. How Good Are Short-Term Aid Projections?
(percent of IMF program projections, sample averages)
Budget Projections
Original Projections (authorities’ Disbursements 
(one-year-ahead commitment-based  (as provided by 
IMF projections) projections) the authorities)
Project aid1
All countries 102.6 109.5 94.9
Of which:
Without program interruptions 106.3 109.1 95.9
With program interruptions2 86.2 111.6 89.7
Program aid (annual data)3
All countries 100.9 . . . 68.5
Of which:
Without program interruptions 106.2 . . . 76.0
With program interruptions2 65.5 . . . 30.8
Of which:4
Grants
All countries 98.3 . . . 87.3
Of which:
Without program interruptions 104.0 . . . 92.3
With program interruptions 5 . . . . . . . . .
Loans
All countries 91.7 . . . 61.6
Of which:
Without program interruptions 100.2 . . . 74.7
With program interruptions 49.1 . . . 3.9
Program aid (quarterly data)6
All countries . . . . . . 49.3
Of which:
Without program interruptions . . . . . . 44.3
With program interruptions 2 . . . . . . 82.9
Source: Authors’ estimates.
1Data for 27 countries for original projections, 24 countries for budget projections, and 31 countries
for actual outturns.
2Data for 4 countries. In one country, no program aid was committed and none was disbursed.
3Data for 23 countries for original projections and 26 countries for actual outturns.
4The sum of grants and loans does not equal total program aid, because it reflects data from a subset
of countries for which the breakdown was available. Grant and loan data are available for 19 and 24 coun-
tries, respectively.
5Averages are not reported, because only one observation was available.
6Average deviation from the quarterly IMF program projection.
19One percentage point of prediction error amounts to about 0.1 percent of GDP.late in the process—and with updated donor commitments—presumably reflects
the pressure exerted by donors for aid recipient countries not to discount their com-
mitments. Although all projections overestimated disbursements on average, dis-
bursements were also frequently underestimated (see Figure 4, top panel). 
Program aid 
Program aid shortfalls vis-à-vis IMF projections are larger than those of project
aid. Both original and IMF program projections overestimated disbursements by,
on average, more than 30 percent.20 Out of the 28 countries, only 4 recorded dis-
bursements in excess of IMF program projections (see Figure 4, middle panel).
Program aid not only falls significantly short of the programmed level, but its
quarterly distribution also differs substantially from the programmed path (see
Figure 4, bottom panel). On average, quarterly outturns deviate by about 50 per-
cent from the quarterly path estimated at the beginning of the program period.
The intuitive explanation for the much larger prediction errors in program aid
projections as compared with project aid lies in the different nature of the condi-
tionality associated with the two types of aid. Unlike project aid, which flows
gradually according to multiple-year disbursement schedules and entails direct
monitoring by donors of some large projects, program aid is generally disbursed
only if the IMF-supported macroeconomic program is on track (it is held back if
the program is off track). The difference in type of conditionality, however, does
not fully explain the excessively optimistic projections. Although countries with
program interruptions received, on average, only about one-third of program aid
commitments, countries with successful, uninterrupted programs received only
three-quarters of program aid commitments.21
What could explain the substantial shortfall vis-à-vis program projections in
programs that remained officially on track? We suggest three possible explana-
tions: (i) program-aid shortfalls originated in donor countries and were not related
to recipient countries’ performance; (ii) aid recipient countries breached donor
conditionality but not that associated with the IMF-supported program; or (iii) the
overestimation reflects strategic behavior by the IMF, given its unique role as
arbiter of external assistance. Unfortunately, we do not have the information
needed to assess the relative importance of these hypotheses.
Another way of dissecting our results is to compare prediction errors for pro-
gram loans and program grants separately. The results show that bilateral aid in
the form of program grants (about one-third of total program aid) has a much
smaller prediction error than program loans (see the bottom part of Table 5).22
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20One percentage point of prediction error amounts to about 0.05 percent of GDP.
21Interestingly, in the group of interrupted programs, the original, one-year-ahead projections were
some 35 percent smaller than the IMF-program projections, perhaps reflecting initial IMF staff skepticism
about the prospects of the country adhering to an IMF-supported program.
22This analysis allows us to compare prediction errors vis-à-vis bilateral and multilateral donors,
respectively. The differentiation in our data is not perfect, however. On the one hand, grants are disbursed
only by bilateral donors. On the other hand, loans are disbursed both by bilateral and multilateral donors.
Moreover, the sample size is smaller than in previous cases (19 and 24 countries for grants and loans,
respectively), primarily because breakdowns of program aid are not available for some countries.Ales ˇ Bulír ˇ and A.Javier Hamann
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Figure 4. Frequency Distribution of Aid Disbursements1
(In percent of program projections)
Sources: IMF questionnaire; authors’ calculations.
1The samples contain 33, 28, and 23 countries, respectively. Countries with no disbursements and
countries with program interruptions are excluded.
2Average deviation from the quarterly projection.AID VOLATILITY: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
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While grant disbursements are almost 13 percent lower than program projections,
the corresponding estimate for loan disbursements is almost 40 percent.
IV. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
In this article, we assess empirically various aspects of the cyclical behavior of aid
flows. Although the overall economic implications of highly volatile and unpre-
dictable aid flows can be substantial—especially in countries that receive large
volumes of aid—the issue has not received enough attention in the literature. We
hope that this article will stimulate further research, particularly in assessing the
robustness of our results to changes in detrending methods, the specific definition
of aid flows, or even the units of measurement. We also hope that the paper will
help in focusing the attention of policymakers on policies aimed at reducing eco-
nomic instability in poor countries.
We find that aid is substantially more volatile than domestic revenues; this
relative volatility grows with the degree of aid dependency; and these results are
quite robust. We also find that shortfalls in aid tend to coincide with shortfalls in
domestic revenue (an indirect measure of the procyclicality of aid) and that coun-
tries that suffer from revenue volatility also exhibit higher volatility in aid
receipts, perhaps because both revenue and aid fluctuations are driven by domes-
tic policy instability.
Given the relatively high volatility of aid, we find the positive correlation of
deviations of aid and revenue from their trends particularly worrisome, since the two
results combined could imply that aid is being disbursed in a less than ideal manner.
While our results in this regard apply to total aid, similar findings for separate com-
ponents of aid have been obtained in other studies. Grants and technical assistance
have been found to be procyclical, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Pallage and
Robe, 2001a). Furthermore, U.S. food aid (provided under Public Law (PL) 480)—
one category of aid that one would expect to be highly countercyclical—has also
been found to be mildly procyclical (Barrett, 2001). The procyclicality of aid is
likely to reflect a variety of factors. At the theoretical level, Svensson (2000) shows
that when donors are unable to monitor the recipient country’s reform effort, a sec-
ond-best outcome arises in which aid disbursements are tied to economic perfor-
mance, thus rendering aid procyclical. In practice, compliance with conditionality
from multilateral agencies and, thus, timely disbursements of aid are less likely
when countries are hit by unforeseen adverse shocks.
We  also show that aid cannot be predicted reliably on the basis of donors’
commitments. There seems to be a tendency for all parties involved (donors, the
local authorities, and the IMF) to systematically overestimate aid disbursements in
aid-receiving countries with IMF-supported programs. Given the economic ineffi-
ciencies and financing difficulties associated with implementing swift fiscal mea-
sures to compensate for large unexpected shortfalls in aid, our findings suggest
that fiscal programming in aid-receiving countries should rely on cautious
assumptions about the availability of committed funds and that projections of aid
disbursements should be based on past experience rather than on promises made
by donors. Of course, budgets can be designed to accommodate aid disbursementsin excess of the conservative baseline, but this should be done in a way that
ensures that domestic currency funds are released to spending agencies only
after the equivalent foreign currency-denominated aid has been deposited at the
central bank.
There is no presumption that our findings of aid volatility, predictability, and
procyclicality must be taken as given. In fact, significant room seems to exist for
both aid recipients and donors to improve the pattern of aid disbursements. For
example, a higher degree of compliance with conditions attached to aid is likely
to lead to a smoother path of aid disbursements. There are also factors, however,
that lead to disruptions in aid disbursements over which the recipient country
has less control. A country hit by an external shock may have its aid flows tem-
porarily suspended because it has delayed the necessary adjustment, owing, for
example, to domestic politics. Adjustment may eventually be undertaken, per-
haps at a more opportune time, but disbursements would be missed and their
macroeconomic impact felt long afterward. This is essentially an avoidable
problem that can be addressed through improved program design.23
Furthermore, as explained by Barrett (2001) for U.S. food aid, the procyclical-
ity of aid can be corrected through the development of reliable early-warning
systems to anticipate emergencies and allow donors to disburse aid when it is
needed most or through improved budgetary practices in the donor country. The
recent emergence of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) is a positive
development in this regard.24 The PRSPs are expected to not only lead to better
design and stronger ownership of the programs supported by multilateral
agencies—and, thus, to higher compliance—but also to play an important role
in coordinating the actions of other donors.
Ales ˇ Bulír ˇ and A.Javier Hamann
84
23There is some evidence that donors may be insufficiently flexible in certain situations and tend
to become increasingly prescriptive with reformers once good policies are in place (Branson and
Hanna, 2000).
24For an explanation of the PRSP and its connection with the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth



















































Table A1. Volatility of Aid and Revenue: Country Data
Correlation Correlation
Volatility (θ ) Relative Coefficient Volatility  (θ ) Relative Coefficient
— — — — — — — — Volatility of  Aid  and  ———————— Volatility of  Aid  and 
Aid Revenue (Φ )R evenue Aid/Revenue Aid Revenue (Φ )R evenue Aid/Revenue
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Ratio — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Ratio
Years In percent of GDP (in percent) In U.S. dollars per capita (in percent)
Argentina 1979–96 0.00 1.33 0.00 0.17 1.54 0.55 7,391.79 0.00 –0.07 1.34
Bangladesh 1975–89 0.68 0.61 1.11 0.21 56.15 3.25 1.92 1.69 0.26 93.33
Belize 1977–89 4.26 0.42 10.22 –0.44 34.85 375.71 465.93 0.81 0.03 27.14
Benin 1985–97 2.26 0.72 3.13 –0.69 101.94 24.44 44.59 0.55 –0.18 101.39
Bolivia 1993–97 0.84 0.39 2.19 0.16 43.84 18.33 201.17 0.09 0.23 47.07
Brazil 1975–94 0.00 7.86 0.00 –0.03 0.46 0.41 9,535.42 0.00 0.23 0.20
Burkina Faso 1992–97 2.23 0.45 4.91 –0.23 125.42 9.27 11.56 0.80 0.53 123.95
Cambodia 1991–97 5.18 1.14 4.53 –0.12 188.33 67.71 9.53 7.10 0.24 168.46
Cameroon 1975–97 1.64 3.72 0.44 –0.39 21.98 26.74 486.23 0.05 –0.09 20.01
Cape Verde 1986–97 2.98 2.71 1.10 0.29 162.05 622.41 244.29 2.55 0.02 184.69
Central African Rep. 1986–97 5.32 0.62 8.52 –0.07 160.90 53.84 23.76 2.27 0.37 157.48
Chad 1986–97 2.69 0.57 4.74 –0.15 266.37 20.59 5.81 3.54 0.50 254.77
China 1979–97 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.14 2.52 0.04 19.72 0.00 –0.06 2.38
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1975–97 1.12 1.34 0.84 0.45 54.31 7.33 20.73 0.35 0.58 44.99
Congo, Republic of 1975–97 9.46 8.04 1.18 –0.06 25.30 747.96 1,856.89 0.40 –0.01 22.63
Costa Rica 1975–97 0.70 0.37 1.90 0.42 19.01 130.06 648.67 0.20 0.28 16.31
Côte d’Ivoire 1988–97 12.91 3.82 3.38 0.11 38.84 317.94 255.12 1.25 –0.32 37.16
Djibouti 1985–97 38.47 3.53 10.90 –0.08 87.56 3,174.30 363.05 8.74 –0.21 78.63
Dominican Republic 1975–97 0.28 1.28 0.22 –0.30 10.47 19.15 393.50 0.05 –0.52 9.72
Ecuador 1975–97 0.04 1.21 0.03 –0.53 8.85 5.75 737.76 0.01 –0.06 8.28
Egypt 1975–97 3.27 6.73 0.49 –0.16 16.94 167.50 2,317.52 0.07 –0.88 14.39
Equatorial Guinea 1986–97 18.24 4.92 3.71 0.42 173.97 358.69 390.90 0.92 0.62 149.14
Ethiopia 1981–97 4.19 7.63 0.55 –0.26 70.45 3.29 7.99 0.41 –0.39 58.83
Fiji 1975–97 0.20 0.83 0.24 –0.10 13.66 49.63 562.84 0.09 –0.12 12.56
Gabon 1979–85 0.04 3.10 0.01 –0.51 3.98 125.34 52,537.78 0.00 0.38 4.82
Gambia, The 1975–97 34.20 3.44 9.93 –0.18 123.61 187.36 67.98 2.76 –0.03 119.37
Ghana 1975–97 1.09 3.11 0.35 0.34 46.62 21.39 195.63 0.11 0.09 35.29
Guatemala 1975–97 0.10 0.60 0.17 0.21 15.87 7.26 64.20 0.11 0.03 16.57
Guinea 1986–97 1.68 1.38 1.21 0.10 86.78 39.31 18.42 2.13 –0.07 90.12
Guinea–Bissau 1983–92 70.87 6.28 11.28 0.30 382.58 150.41 38.78 3.88 0.53 372.47
Guyana 1975–97 39.48 8.23 4.80 –0.06 36.00 1,252.43 829.67 1.51 0.04 36.56
Haiti 1975–97 21.91 2.35 9.34 –0.22 94.45 187.03 22.18 8.43 –0.12 97.21
Honduras 1975–97 2.52 0.46 5.51 0.27 45.89 68.10 99.85 0.68 –0.36 48.04
India 1975–97 0.03 0.21 0.17 0.06 7.28 0.15 4.37 0.04 0.27 5.84
Indonesia 1975–97 0.03 0.94 0.03 –0.16 6.23 0.65 82.96 0.01 0.05 5.75
Jamaica 1975–97 0.55 2.08 0.27 0.46 13.73 4.59 1,272.84 0.00 0.00 14.56




































Volatility (θ ) Relative Coefficient Volatility  (θ ) Relative Coefficient
— — — — — — — — Volatility of  Aid  and  ———————— Volatility of  Aid  and 
Aid Revenue (Φ )R evenue Aid/Revenue Aid Revenue (Φ )R evenue Aid/Revenue
— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Ratio — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Ratio
Years In percent of GDP (in percent) In U.S. dollars per capita (in percent)
Kenya 1975–97 1.53 1.64 0.93 –0.24 33.59 12.73 70.94 0.18 0.24 34.62
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 1988–97 16.94 1.23 13.72 0.31 176.40 20.94 11.13 1.88 0.50 174.10
Lesotho 1982–97 3.60 17.01 0.21 0.49 51.00 25.91 70.16 0.37 0.62 46.19
Madagascar 1988–96 5.99 0.69 8.66 –0.45 120.90 28.23 12.10 2.33 0.01 128.11
Malawi 1975–97 12.27 1.63 7.51 0.35 97.98 14.51 17.57 0.83 0.22 97.33
Mali 1975–88 11.00 0.86 12.82 0.12 142.79 25.95 5.82 4.46 0.04 145.89
Mauritania 1990–96 29.00 6.84 4.24 0.61 99.70 307.39 59.81 5.14 0.22 96.87
Mexico 1975–97 0.00 0.46 0.00 –0.24 0.50 0.32 5,883.07 0.00 –0.13 0.50
Mozambique 1980–97 79.78 6.12 13.03 0.23 236.20 34.05 30.38 1.12 –0.10 186.43
Nepal 1975–96 0.62 0.12 5.13 0.20 112.19 2.06 1.05 1.97 0.43 113.73
Nicaragua 1975–96 50.74 516.93 0.10 –0.09 66.71 912.92 113,647.89 0.01 –0.12 36.37
Niger 1985–97 9.63 0.64 15.13 –0.48 183.43 19.20 8.54 2.25 –0.08 176.77
Nigeria 1975–97 0.03 4.63 0.01 –0.33 3.23 0.14 668.24 0.00 0.20 1.40
Pakistan 1975–97 0.48 0.25 1.95 0.12 19.03 3.84 9.01 0.43 0.07 17.42
Panama 1975–96 0.14 1.36 0.10 0.21 4.79 96.52 1,716.84 0.06 0.26 4.51
Papua New Guinea 1975–94 1.67 1.91 0.88 –0.01 53.58 86.51 292.00 0.30 0.05 49.93
Paraguay 1975–93 0.07 0.27 0.26 0.20 17.56 18.76 200.14 0.09 0.18 12.57
Peru 1975–97 0.06 1.37 0.05 0.31 7.55 5.98 581.48 0.01 –0.23 7.23
Philippines 1975–97 0.12 0.36 0.33 –0.06 10.73 4.91 51.13 0.10 –0.20 10.32
Rwanda 1975–85 58.56 3.20 18.32 0.05 197.97 212.25 29.67 7.15 –0.92 177.61
Senegal 1975–84 3.94 2.27 1.73 –0.06 53.28 67.41 160.82 0.42 0.04 52.70
Sierra Leone 1975–97 5.63 1.80 3.14 0.44 107.24 33.70 26.14 1.29 0.40 94.09
Sri Lanka 1975–97 1.34 3.29 0.41 0.04 33.89 8.85 25.39 0.35 0.04 33.55
Swaziland 1975–97 2.34 7.15 0.33 0.58 21.77 96.71 1,057.13 0.09 0.49 19.43
Tanzania 1988–97 8.15 1.33 6.11 0.33 185.18 17.80 20.94 0.85 0.46 113.14
Thailand 1975–97 0.01 0.18 0.07 0.12 5.49 1.60 521.20 0.00 0.57 4.31
Togo 1975–97 4.78 5.07 0.94 0.62 48.98 69.90 189.92 0.37 0.62 47.77
Tunisia 1975–96 0.16 0.72 0.23 –0.22 12.10 28.22 396.03 0.07 0.26 7.82
Turkey 1975–96 0.06 0.62 0.09 0.03 2.90 27.97 1,094.49 0.03 0.22 2.80
Uganda 1975–97 6.72 2.81 2.39 0.10 131.10 7.94 70.82 0.11 –0.03 95.47
Uruguay 1975–97 0.01 1.38 0.01 0.42 1.33 10.78 12,209.22 0.00 0.28 1.29
Venezuela 1975–97 0.00 5.56 0.00 0.95 0.19 0.37 12,922.44 0.00 0.32 0.16
Yemen, Republic of 1990–97 0.75 39.25 0.02 0.84 11.43 20.14 472.71 0.04 0.29 10.31
Zambia 1975–96 58.93 1.92 30.69 0.12 70.98 801.79 153.36 5.23 –0.02 61.14
Zimbabwe 1975–97 1.48 1.11 1.33 0.29 16.74 54.36 472.86 0.11 0.00 16.00
Source: Authors’ estimates.APPENDIX II
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Table A2. List of Countries Used in the Survey
Country Period Type of IMF Arrangement
Albania January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Algeria July 1998–June 1999   EFF
Azerbaijan January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Bolivia January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Burkina Faso January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Cambodia January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Cameroon July 1998–June 1999   ESAF
Cape Verde January 1998–December 1998   Stand-By
Central African Republic* January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Congo, Republic of* December 1997–December 1998    ESAF
Côte d’Ivoire January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Djibouti January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Dominican Republic January 1998–December 1998 None
Ecuador January 1998–December 1998 None
Egypt June 1998–June 1999   Stand-By
El Salvador December 1997–December 1998   Stand-By
Gabon January 1998–December 1998 EFF
Ghana January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Guyana January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Indonesia April 1998–March 1999 Stand-By/EFF
Jordan January 1998–December 1998 EFF
Kyrgyz Republic January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. October 1997–September 1998 None
Macedonia, FYR of  January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Madagascar January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Mauritania January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Mongolia January 1998–December 1999 ESAF
Mozambique December 1997–December 1998   ESAF
Nepal July 16, 1998–July 15, 1999    None
Nigeria January 1998–December 1998 None
Panama January 1998–December 1998 EFF
Papua New Guinea* January 1998–December 1998 None
Sierra Leone January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Tajikistan July 1998–June 1999   ESAF
Yemen January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Zambia* January 1998–December 1998 ESAF
Zimbabwe* January 1998–December 1998 Stand-By
Notes: The symbol * denotes an interruption in the Fund program; ESAF denotes Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility; EFF denotes Extended Fund Facility; and Stand-By denotes Stand-
By Arrangement.REFERENCES
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